September 27, 1966. Hunters Point, a predominantly black section of San Francisco, erupts in a riot. Compared to Watts, or, especially, the riots to come in 1967 and 1968, the violence is relatively mild: it only lasts 128 hours, and no one is killed.  Two days later, however, LBJ tells Robert McNamara that he has received a frantic 2AM phone call from San Francisco’s mayor asking for help in finding work for the city’s young black men. (Listen to the LBJ-McNamara conversation here: this discussion begins at about 5:45.) LBJ has asked his staff to see if there might be work available around the defense industry, such as in the Navy Yards. Then, at about 6:46, LBJ describes the impact the riots are having on support for civil rights: “These people are…these old dogs won’t hunt any more.” LBJ blames rioters for “a great revulsion taking place” against civil rights. While this is especially true in the south, LBJ adds that “the Daleys are awfully bitter” and that places like Chicago and New York are also becoming less hospitable to federal civil rights actions. LBJ refers to “my Demonstration Cities bill,” which was a bill currently before Congress that proposed an ambitious plan to partner with local governments in tackling urban problems. The fight over model cities is heated, but the bill becomes law in November.   Photo via FoundSF.
Zoom

September 27, 1966. Hunters Point, a predominantly black section of San Francisco, erupts in a riot. Compared to Watts, or, especially, the riots to come in 1967 and 1968, the violence is relatively mild: it only lasts 128 hours, and no one is killed. 

Two days later, however, LBJ tells Robert McNamara that he has received a frantic 2AM phone call from San Francisco’s mayor asking for help in finding work for the city’s young black men. (Listen to the LBJ-McNamara conversation here: this discussion begins at about 5:45.) LBJ has asked his staff to see if there might be work available around the defense industry, such as in the Navy Yards.

Then, at about 6:46, LBJ describes the impact the riots are having on support for civil rights: “These people are…these old dogs won’t hunt any more.” LBJ blames rioters for “a great revulsion taking place” against civil rights. While this is especially true in the south, LBJ adds that “the Daleys are awfully bitter” and that places like Chicago and New York are also becoming less hospitable to federal civil rights actions. LBJ refers to “my Demonstration Cities bill,” which was a bill currently before Congress that proposed an ambitious plan to partner with local governments in tackling urban problems. The fight over model cities is heated, but the bill becomes law in November.  

Photo via FoundSF.

September 5, 1966. The march on Cicero, Illinois, proceeds despite Dr. King’s withdrawal. This eight-minute video from the Chicago Film Archives shows the 250 marchers, including many white supporters, flanked by several thousand members of the National Guard and Cook County police. Around the 5:20 mark, the tensions between the marchers and angry protesters flare up: this rage is what city and state officials were afraid of—and the reason Cook County Sheriff Ogilvie called marching in Cicero “awfully close to a suicidal act.” The tenor of the marchers, as well, some of whom can be seen to be gesturing to and interacting with the crowd, indicates the shift from Dr. King’s vision of nonviolence. 

December 14, 1965. The Outside Task Force on Urban Affairs and Housing, tasked by LBJ to investigate the causes of the riots in Watts, submits its report to the President. Their statement of “the urban problem”:  “-the great dimensions of unmet housing needs: some 7 million urban families live in homes of such disrepair as to violate housing code standards of major cities. -the growth of population: 2 million new units of housing are needed each year for the foreseeable future—an increase in the volume of production 25% greater than has ever been achieved before. -the chronic inability of the country to provide low income housing of adequate quality at a reasonable price… -the special problem of the poor and the Negro unable to move freely from racial ghettos and subject to heavy exploitation in the costs they pay for the  necessities of life: 3 our of 10 slum houses are now occupied by Negroes, and at high rent levels the proportion of Negro families living in substandard housing is six times greater than that of white families.  -the inability of metropolitan areas to deal with the movement of people and goods, in particular the failure to provide adequate mass transportation for families who do not own an automobile or where use of private vehicles is unnecessary  uneconomical, or socially undesirable.  -increasing pressures on municiple costs… -unnecessary and unwarranted restrictions for the suburban American as well—expressed in uniformity in housing choices, excessive costs of community facilities and services, gross deficiencies in recreation and leisure time opportunities.  —for all metropolitan residents, urban and suburban alike, unnecessary costs imposed by lengthy journeys to work, growing dangers from water and air pollution.” Report, “Outside 1965 Task Force on Urban Affairs and Housing”, 12/14/1965, Task Force Reports, Box 3. LBJ Library. Map: Los Angeles Metro, today. 
Zoom

December 14, 1965. The Outside Task Force on Urban Affairs and Housing, tasked by LBJ to investigate the causes of the riots in Watts, submits its report to the President. Their statement of “the urban problem”: 

“-the great dimensions of unmet housing needs: some 7 million urban families live in homes of such disrepair as to violate housing code standards of major cities.

-the growth of population: 2 million new units of housing are needed each year for the foreseeable future—an increase in the volume of production 25% greater than has ever been achieved before.

-the chronic inability of the country to provide low income housing of adequate quality at a reasonable price…

-the special problem of the poor and the Negro unable to move freely from racial ghettos and subject to heavy exploitation in the costs they pay for the  necessities of life: 3 our of 10 slum houses are now occupied by Negroes, and at high rent levels the proportion of Negro families living in substandard housing is six times greater than that of white families. 

-the inability of metropolitan areas to deal with the movement of people and goods, in particular the failure to provide adequate mass transportation for families who do not own an automobile or where use of private vehicles is unnecessary  uneconomical, or socially undesirable. 

-increasing pressures on municiple costs…

-unnecessary and unwarranted restrictions for the suburban American as well—expressed in uniformity in housing choices, excessive costs of community facilities and services, gross deficiencies in recreation and leisure time opportunities. 

—for all metropolitan residents, urban and suburban alike, unnecessary costs imposed by lengthy journeys to work, growing dangers from water and air pollution.”

Report, “Outside 1965 Task Force on Urban Affairs and Housing”, 12/14/1965, Task Force Reports, Box 3. LBJ Library. Map: Los Angeles Metro, today. 

T. H. Baker, interviewer: Did you also face, at that time [after the Watts Riots], this question of whether or not to accelerate and initiate new federal programs in riot areas?  LBJ Aide Harry McPherson: Yes, we did. B: Or, as others said, to reward the rioters?  M: Yes.  This was one of the most perplexing subjects that I can think of.  There was almost a standard conversation after the riots that began by saying that the country wouldn’t tolerate rewarding the rioters.  And it would end by the development of substantial programs to rush into the area.  And knowing that we were doing precisely what we said we were not doing…. The Justice Department, again, felt inadequate to the task because it did not have the same kind of network of information that it had in the South, and it had to rely in considerable part on the FBI.… B: The Clark [Ramsey Clark, Deputy Attorney General] group who went out to Watts wrote a report when they came back.  Do you know what happened to that report?  M: Well, insofar as it called for substantial expenditures of one sort or another for social programs, it was not surfaced and trumpeted by the Administration.  We were having our first difficulties with finding enough money for social programs.  The President was quite dubious about the possibility of getting major social appropriations through in the aftermath of the riots.  He thought that it would be rather hard to defend that in Congress, and I suspect he was quite right.  His intelligence sources in Congress were far better than anybody else’s. Photo: Harry McPherson with LBJ in 1967. Read the rest of the McPherson oral history here.  
Zoom

T. H. Baker, interviewer: Did you also face, at that time [after the Watts Riots], this question of whether or not to accelerate and initiate new federal programs in riot areas? 

LBJ Aide Harry McPherson: Yes, we did.

B: Or, as others said, to reward the rioters? 

M: Yes.  This was one of the most perplexing subjects that I can think of.  There was almost a standard conversation after the riots that began by saying that the country wouldn’t tolerate rewarding the rioters.  And it would end by the development of substantial programs to rush into the area.  And knowing that we were doing precisely what we said we were not doing…. The Justice Department, again, felt inadequate to the task because it did not have the same kind of network of information that it had in the South, and it had to rely in considerable part on the FBI.…

B: The Clark [Ramsey Clark, Deputy Attorney General] group who went out to Watts wrote a report when they came back.  Do you know what happened to that report? 

M: Well, insofar as it called for substantial expenditures of one sort or another for social programs, it was not surfaced and trumpeted by the Administration.  We were having our first difficulties with finding enough money for social programs.  The President was quite dubious about the possibility of getting major social appropriations through in the aftermath of the riots.  He thought that it would be rather hard to defend that in Congress, and I suspect he was quite right.  His intelligence sources in Congress were far better than anybody else’s.

Photo: Harry McPherson with LBJ in 1967. Read the rest of the McPherson oral history here.  

August 11, 1965. The Watts Riots break out in Los Angeles, less than a week after the Voting Rights Act became law. LBJ is stunned. Here’s LBJ aide Harry McPherson on the White House reaction:  “Generally, one of despair that it had happened and that it would almost certainly jeopardize a lot that we were trying to do. It seemed to justify the worst feelings of the racists in Congress and in the press. It would obviously make it more difficult to pass any legislation if needed, and it worked a very severe and immediate strain on the coalition of liberals. The President, and all of us, were baffled by it for a long time. Our data was almost nonexistent. It took us several days to understand that Watts was not a conventional eastern city tenement area, but it was an area of small houses. It would take many months before information would come in about family breakdown, poverty, delinquency in Watts.” Read the rest of McPherson’s oral history here. Photos from Flickr Creative Commons, by Johnny Rorschach. 
Zoom
August 11, 1965. The Watts Riots break out in Los Angeles, less than a week after the Voting Rights Act became law. LBJ is stunned. Here’s LBJ aide Harry McPherson on the White House reaction:  “Generally, one of despair that it had happened and that it would almost certainly jeopardize a lot that we were trying to do. It seemed to justify the worst feelings of the racists in Congress and in the press. It would obviously make it more difficult to pass any legislation if needed, and it worked a very severe and immediate strain on the coalition of liberals. The President, and all of us, were baffled by it for a long time. Our data was almost nonexistent. It took us several days to understand that Watts was not a conventional eastern city tenement area, but it was an area of small houses. It would take many months before information would come in about family breakdown, poverty, delinquency in Watts.” Read the rest of McPherson’s oral history here. Photos from Flickr Creative Commons, by Johnny Rorschach. 
Zoom

August 11, 1965. The Watts Riots break out in Los Angeles, less than a week after the Voting Rights Act became law. LBJ is stunned. Here’s LBJ aide Harry McPherson on the White House reaction: 

“Generally, one of despair that it had happened and that it would almost certainly jeopardize a lot that we were trying to do. It seemed to justify the worst feelings of the racists in Congress and in the press. It would obviously make it more difficult to pass any legislation if needed, and it worked a very severe and immediate strain on the coalition of liberals. The President, and all of us, were baffled by it for a long time. Our data was almost nonexistent. It took us several days to understand that Watts was not a conventional eastern city tenement area, but it was an area of small houses. It would take many months before information would come in about family breakdown, poverty, delinquency in Watts.”

Read the rest of McPherson’s oral history here. Photos from Flickr Creative Commons, by Johnny Rorschach. 
“For the past three days the Nation has been shocked by reports of rioting and disorder in the streets of our largest and one of our proudest cities.” —-LBJ’s Statement by the President on the Riots in New York City, July 21, 1964. The Harlem riots began on July 18, after the fatal shooting of a 15-year-old African American teenager. Photo via the Library of Congress.  
Zoom

“For the past three days the Nation has been shocked by reports of rioting and disorder in the streets of our largest and one of our proudest cities.”


—-LBJ’s Statement by the President on the Riots in New York City, July 21, 1964. The Harlem riots began on July 18, after the fatal shooting of a 15-year-old African American teenager. Photo via the Library of Congress.